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We argue that both Russellian and Heimian definites exist in nat-
ural languages. Our account captures both the commonality and
difference between the two. Further, we suggest that the Russel-
lian/Heimian distinction extends to indefinites too.
1 Introduction
One morning, Alice tells (1) to her husband, John, who doesn't read newspa-
pers. Her use of the president is dependent on the uniqueness of president in
the fixed domain she is talking about (i.e. the U.S. politics situation). Let's
call it a Russellian domain (R-domain) and such a use of definite description
Russellian definiteness (R-definiteness).
(1) Hey John, the president resigned!!
In the evening John describes a scene he saw in the afternoon with (2).
Clearly, the described scene contains at least two dogs, thus the uniqueness
of dogs on which his use of the dog is dependent is not w.r.t. the scene as
a whole, but rather w.r.t. a domain dynamically constructed by his first
sentence. Let's call such a domain a Heimian domain (H-domain) and such
a use of definite description Heimian definiteness (H-definiteness).
(2) I found a dog on the lawn. The dog was biting another dog 	
An R-domain r is something out there, not necessarily within our com-
prehension in its totality. An H-domain h is the part of such an r which is
known, or already familiar, to the conversation participants, which grows as
the conversation proceeds. Then, assuming the lattice-theoretic ontology of
[1], we say the denotation of a definite description is max(d, p), where max is
a function that maps an R- or H-domain d and a property p to the maximal
individual which has p in d; the uniqueness, then, follows from the singular
morphology of the NP.
The Russellian/Heimian distinction (hereafter, the R/H distinction) is
a result of the choice of the domain (cf. [2]). Regarding such domains as
85
resource situations in the situation semantic sense, we argue for the signifi-
cance of the R/H distinction for English and other languages.
2 Inclusiveness
H-definiteness is named after [3], which reduces definiteness to familiarity.
We formulate familiarity in terms of domains (situations), while [3] formu-
lates it in terms of individuals (file cards). Here, [4]'s inclusiveness analysis
is formulated as the maximality function max. For example, in (3), the boys
refers to the three boys the speaker met.
(3) I met two boys at 10:00. I met another at 11:00. The boys were
	
This is only natural, since the H-domain contains three boys when the boys
is uttered.'
3 Accommodation
Cases like (1) could offer a problem for reduction of definiteness to famil-
iarity, since the president wasn't introduced explicitly in the discourse be-
forehand; hence [3]'s appeal to accommodation. However, we want to have
some characterization of when accommodation is or isn't possible.
In our view, "accommodated" definites are simply R-definites. (1) is a
case in point; John knows that there is only one president in the U.S., so he
only has to identify the R-domain (the U.S. politics situation). In contrast,
in (2), it isn't part of Alice's knowledge that the H-domain (the witnessed
scene), or some other R-domain, contains a unique dog, hence the oddity of
starting with (2').
(2') I found the dog
	
The two kinds of definiteness can interact (associative use). In (4), the
first sentence constructs an H-domain, which contains a car x. It is part of
common knowledge that a car has a unique fence, so it is known that x has
a unique fence in its car situation, which is an R-domain (cf. [5]). This
is why its fence is felicitous. In contrast, if x wasn't initially introduced in
the Heimian way, we wouldn't have no clue as to which car's car situation is
used as resource; hence, starting the conversation with the second sentence
of (4) is infelicitous.
(4) I saw a car. Its fence was 	
4 Crosslinguistic ranges of definiteness
While that president can't replace the president in (1), that dog can re-
place the dog in (2). Here we follow [6], [7] and [8] in treating both the P
and that P (and proper names etc.) as definite descriptions. This means
that, in explaining the replacement fact, we can't appeal to something like
the description/direct-reference distinction; rather, we have to explain it as
commonalities and differences between two kinds of descriptions.
My proposal here is that that P requires an H-domain while the P is
compatible either with an H- or R-domain. The replacement fact about
(1)-(2) follows from this proposal; the and that partially overlap in meaning
(see also [9]).
Seen from this perspective, some languages appear to mark the R/H
distinction overtly. For example, in Japanese, inu can appear either with or
without an article, depending on the context (inu roughly means dog). The
article sono can attach to inu only when it is used as an H-definite. Thus,
sono can't attach to the translation of the president in (1), while the dog in
(2) can be translated into sono inu. Thus, sono corresponds to both that
and the Heimian the.2
Further, I suggest that Japanese is not the only such language. For
example, consider the examples (5)-(8) of Bavarian ([10], p. 69; originally
from a paper by Hannes Scheutz) of Bavarian; da is Russellian and dea is
Heimian (we assume that names are R-definites).3
(5) Dai*Dea Kare is kema.
`Karl has arrived.'
(6) Da/*Dea Kini is gschtoabm.
`The King has died.'
(7) Da/*Dea Schnaps is daia.
`Schnaps is expensive.'
(8) I hab a Bia un Schnaps bschdait. Dea/*Da Schnaps war daia.
`I have ordered a beer and a schnaps. The schnaps was expensive.'
5 Extension to indefinite descriptions
If indefinite descriptions are to be analyzed in terms of existential claims
on a given domain (i.e. resource situation), then we will expect the R/H
distinction is applicable to indefinites too. When an R-domain is chosen, a
boy is to refer to an arbitrary boy. In contrast, if an H-domain is chosen, it
is to refer to one of the boys already introduced in the discourse.4
The distinction overtly marked in Turkish noted in [12] can be viewed
as such a case. [12] attempts to capture this distinction by stipulating two
kinds of discourse referents. In contrast, with the R/H distinction, we need
no such new stipulation.5
6 Conclusion
In our analysis, H-definiteness is regarded as familiarity of H-domains, in-
stead of familiarity of individuals; the latter is derivative from the former
(also note that R-definites are also "familiar" in a sense; it is only that
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Heimian familiarity, but not Russellian familiarity, is sensitive to discourse
dynamics). Our move from individuals to domains is in line with [14]'s situ-
ation semantic arguments for the notion of resource situation (although not
necessarily with his generalized-quantifier analysis of (in)definites).
From the considerations in the previous sections, we conclude that the
Russellian/Heimian distinction is something too significant to miss.'
Notes
*I would like to thank Shuichi Yatabe for discussion. I would also like
to thank Tomoko Inagawa, Masayo Iida, Motoko Katayama, Mika Kizu,
Atsushi Shimojima and some students at Kokushikan University for native
judgments on Japanese. Of course, all remaining errors are mine.
1 1n principle, a single conversation can involve two or more H-domains;
each H-domain is part of some or other R-domain. However, the hearer can't
finely distinguish them without a good clue, in which case she only assumes
one big H-domain subsuming all these small H-domains, as in (3).
'Here we are only saying that H-definites are explicitly so marked in
the grammar by sono; we don't intend here to analyze bare nominals in
Japanese, which can mean not only R-definites but also indefinites and
generics, and further, for some speakers, H-definites in addition.
In a more extensive study we will have to say that this in English and
kono and ano in Japanese are also overt markers of H-definiteness (in fact,
some Heimian uses of the translate to kono rather than sono).
3 [10] cites a paper by Karen Ebert and says that Frisian also follows
this pattern (p. 69). On the other hand, [11]'s data, also cited in [10], of
Indonesian could also be interpreted as exhibiting a similar contrast (bare
nominals vs. those with itu or -nya, the former of which is a demonstrative
corresponding to that according to [11]).
Both [10] and [11] view the distinctions in terms of genericity. I can't
examine their positions in this paper (cf. n. 2).
Tut in [7]'5 terms, the R/H distinction for an indefinite then resides in
whether its role should be assumed in an R-domain or an H-domain.
5 [13] observes that similar contrasts are overtly marked in German and
Dutch etc. in terms of linear order. I have nothing interesting to say about
this here.
6 Due to lack of space I can't discuss [15] or the technical details of the
present analysis (quantification over situations, novelty of indefinites, etc.).
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